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Has the Single Act really changed European political cooperation? 
Words, when skillfully used, can mean a lot in the world of lawyers. Thus, 
the fairly general heading of Title III of the Single Act - "Treaty Provisions on 
European Cooperation in the Sphere of Foreign Policy" - may be seen as 
encapsulating both the importance and the limits of the changes introduced by 
that part of the Act. The reference to "Treaty provisions" suggests that the "High 
Contracting Parties" - as, significantly, the Member States of the European 
Community are called in that part of the Act - intended to give legal value to 
the commitments therein contained. At the same time, the use of an 
expression like "cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy", which was 
preferred to the more integrated (and Community-like) "common foreign 
policy", clearly indicates that their intention was not to alter radically the set of 
procedures which have characterized European Political Cooperation from its 
inception. One could therefore argue that we find in the very heading of Title III 
the essence of the changes contained in that part of the Act: A formal 
"legalization" of a process which was not hitherto regarded as legally binding, 
but no substantive transformation of its functioning, if one excludes the long 
awaited creation of a Secretariat. 
And, indeed, most of the comments dedicated to the Single Act and its 
impact on political cooperation are variations on this very theme. With few 
exceptions, they conclude — more or less explicitly — that the new treaty fell 
short of the hopes for structural consolidation of the cooperation mechanisms 
developed in the 1970s. Significantly, in the torrents of literature generated by 
the Single Act, comments on its EPC part occupy a very modest place'. Even 
those who have scrutinized the provisions of Title III stress how meager the 
1  See for instance the works of Bosco, "Commentaire de l'Acte unique européen des 17-28 
février 1987 (sic)", CDE (1987) 355-82; Glaesner, "l'Acte unique européen", RMC (1986), 307-
321 at 310, Jacqué, "L'Acte unique européen", RTDE (1986), 575-612 at 609-612, and  
Pescatore, "Observations critiques sur l'Acte Unique européen", in L'Acte unique européen,  
Bruxelles: Institut d'études européennes, 1986, 39-66 at 53-54.  
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substantive changes were2. In reading those accounts, one might well think 
that the best way to describe the achievements of the intergovernmental 
conference in the field of political cooperation is probably to list what the 
Single Act did not do: it did not substantially alter the intergovernmental 
character of EPC or its functioning; nor did it achieve its integration in the 
Community framework. The only innovation, so the literature argued, was that 
EPC was made part of a binding treaty, but who — except perhaps lawyers —
could get excited by a formal legalization which left the substance untouched? 
The classical analysis thus emphasizes the dual character of a reform 
which can be regarded both as significant because of its forma and as 
disappointing because of its substance. According to this line of thinking, the 
failure to establish a true common foreign policy — modelled, say, on the 
common commercial policy of the Community — can seen as reflecting a 
"honoured" tradition of EPC, in which procedural and rhetorical elements have 
often seemed to have priority over substantive questions. At the same time, the 
contrast between those two dimensions — form and substance — can also give 
rise to a number of questions: Is the legal matrix "merely" form? What can be 
the sense, if any, of the bare legalization of EPC operated by the Single Act ? 
Did it involve some significant change in the quality of the relationships 
between all actors involved? One can argue that no serious answer can be 
given to these questions without addressing first a crucial preliminary 
question, namely the status of political cooperation before the 1986-87 reform, 
2 
 See for instance Jean De Ruyt, L Acte unique européen, Bruxelles: Institut 66tudes 
europdennes, 1987, 219-251; Horst G. Krenzler, "Die Einheitliche Europäische Akte als Schritt 
auf dem Wege zu einer Gemeinsamen Europäische Außenpolitik", 21 
 Europarecht 
 (1986) 384-
391; Giovanni Jannuzzi, "La politica estera dell'Europa Comunitaria", 43 La Comunità 
internazionale If 988) 192-227; Diego Linan Nogueras, "Cooperacion Politica y Acta Unica 
Europea", 13 Revista de Instituciones Europeas (1986) 45)-74; Simon Nuttall, "European 
Political Cooperation and the Single European Act", 5 Yearbook of  European Law  (1985), 203-
232; Eric Stein, "European Foreign Affairs and the Single Act of 1986", 23 International Lawyer  
(1989) 977-994; Wolfgang Wessels, "Die Einheitliche Europäische Akte: Die Europäische 
Zusammenarbeit in der Außenpolitik", 9 Integration ( 1986) 127-133. 
3 	 Interestingly, this point is stressed in the comments of two insiders. See Giovanni Jannuzzi, 
"La Cooperazione Politica Europea", Affari esteri, N°75, 1987, 320-329, and Simon Nuttall, 
supra note 2. 
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for it is only against this background that any changes can be properly 
evaluated. Is it really the case that prior to the Single Act EPC operated in a 
legal vacuum? 
These will be some of the issues we intend to tackle in this paper. They 
are rooted in the belief that by focusing on these kind of questions, it is 
possible to cast some new light on the impact of the Single Act. Our intention 
is not to shatter the classical analysis, which we regard as essentially correct. 
Our purpose is far more modest: we would like to examine to what extent 
legal analysis can finesse or render more subtle, and hence more accurate, 
our understanding of Title III and its place in the evolution of EPC. 
II. EPC before the Single Act 
Although at its inception European integration was to a large extent driven 
by security concerns and by underlying conceptions of global balance, 
cooperation in the field of foreign policy has always been a most difficult 
exercise. Major crises like the rejection of the European Defense Community 
and, later, the failure of the Fouchet plan, led to a strong emphasis on 
economic integration. Widespread functionalists schemes rested on the hope 
that a level of economic cohesion would naturally bring the Member States, 
one day, to cooperate increasingly closely in the sphere of high politics. 
However, when EPC started to develop in the early 1970s, special care was 
taken to organize it on the fringes of the Community, for if Member States were 
keen to coordinate their foreign policies, they were not prepared to relinquish 
their sovereign powers in that field. Thus, EPC was established and later 
reinforced on the basis of a series of pragmatic arrangements worked out by 
national governments. The different stages of this process — from the 
Luxembourg Report to the Solemn Declaration on European Union — are well 
known and need not be recalled here. Lacking a firm treaty basis, working 
according to its own rules, without direct involvement of the Community 
-4 - 
institutions (especially in the early years), EPC developped as a system of its 
own, legally as well as physically distinct from the steadily growing Community 
apparatus. 
Theorically at least, the entire system essentially rested on the good-will of, 
the Member States, since in strict legal terms, they were not even bound to 
consult each other. As early as 1975, the Tindemans Report tried to 
consolidate this somewhat loose system by inviting the Member States to give 
legal value to EPC voluntary procedures. But the suggestion was not 
immediately followed: both the London Report and the Stuttgart Declaration, 
which further tied Member State's links in the foreign policy area, carefully 
avoided any quantum leap of that kind4. Later on, during the course of the 
discussions on external relations in the Dooge Committee, the Danish and the 
Greek delegates made it clear that they could not accept limiting their 
sovereignty by formal commitments. Both expressly rejected the idea of a 
codification of EPC rules and practices5. 
Yet, to some people at least, the elaborate cooperation network set up by 
the Member States in the 1970s and the intricate web of relationships to which 
it gave rise appeared sufficiently constraining to suggest that the basic EPC 
agreements might be regarded as legally binding6. This thesis had the great 
value of reminding us that international legal commitments can arise without a 
formal treaty. Consent can be given through words or through behaviour 
giving rise to expectations on which reliance is placed, and the steadiness of 
EPC might well be seen as coming within this concept. At the same time, there 
were as we saw many counter-indications which pointed to the fact that states 
4 Point 4.3. of the Stuttgart Declaration only envisaged the conclusion of a treaty at the time 
when the text of the Declaration would be revise. 
5 
 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for Institutional Affairs, presented to the European Council in 
March 1985. The report has been published as an annex to R. Bieber, J.-P. Jacqu6 and J. 
Weiler (eds.), An Ever Closer Union - A Critical Analysis of the Draft Treaty Establishing the 
European Union, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EC, 1985, at 330-342. 
6 See for instance Jochen 
 A. Froweìn, "European Political Cooperation", in R. Bernhardt (ad.), 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
 vol. 6, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1983, 199-201. 
-5- 
were not regarding themselves as legally bound by the process, and were not 
prepared to accept a formalization of EPC. To speak of binding commitments 
therefore ran counter to one of the cardinal axioms of international law, 
according to which the creation of legal obligation rests on the consent of 
subjects of international law, and no State can as a rule be legally bound 
against its will. Yet such a bold thesis had the merit of stressing the odd side of 
a situation where the actual autonomy enjoyed by the Member States of the 
Community appeared as somehow limited by their participation in EPC, 
without this limitation being reflected in their legal position. 
Ambiguous as such a situation may seem, it is worth stressing that it is not 
without equivalent on the international scene. Resolutions adopted by 
international organizations, codes of conduct, documents of a clear 
programmatic nature like, say, the Helsinki Final Act are good examples in 
point. Although they clearly aim at shaping States' behaviour, those texts are 
generally not regarded as establishing legal rights and obligations, for such 
was not their authors' intention. This, however, does not exclude their wielding 
some indirect legal effects. Indeed, during the last twenty years or so, 
international law doctrine has tried to carve a concept which could provide a 
description of the actual impact of such non-binding agreements on the legal 
sphere7. Such "soft law" instruments can serve as a basis for the enactment of 
national legislation; they can also transform to "matters of international 
concern" issues which States could hitherto regard as part of their domestic 
jurisdiction: notwithstanding the fact that it did not create legal obligations, the 
Helsinki Final Act prevented the Soviet Union and its then satellites from 
claiming that human rights problems were internal matters which could not be 
raised internationally. Moreover, by legitimizing certain types of behaviour, this 
kind of instrument may represent an important stage in the process that leads 
7 See for instance Michel Virally, "La distinction entre textes internationaux ayant une portée 
juridique dans les relations mutuelles entre leurs auteurs et textes internationaux qui en sont 
dépourvus - Rapport définitif', Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international, vol. 60-I, 1983, 328-
357.  
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to the elaboration of customary international Iaw8. 
It is not our intention to engage here in a lengthy discussion of the 
complex relationships which may exist between facts and law in the 
international legal order. All we want to suggest here is that although its 
precise scope remains unclear, the "soft law" construct can be regarded as a 
useful instrument for understanding the radiating effect which basic EPC 
documents undoubtedly had in the pre-Single Act years. Their "soft" legal 
value can, at least in part, account for the influence political cooperation 
exerted on the Member States and for the sense of comity which developed 
between the European partners. Could one really argue that in the face of 
EPC the latter felt as free as before in the elaboration and the conduct of their 
foreign policy? Whether the constraint under which they operated was legal 
or otherwise is an interesting philosophical question, but it could be also be 
posed in relation to many other sources of'international laws. Likewise, from a 
historical viewpoint this time, the "soft law" concept may be useful in 
understanding how pragmatic arrangements have slowly crystallized into 
binding rules of law; we shall come back later to this issue. 
There is, however, one additional legal dimension — with nothing "soft" 
about it — which predates the Single European Act. 
Being essentially a science based on categories, law sometimes makes 
things look more diverse than they actually are. Although, as stated above, the 
Member States sought to retain their sovereignty in fields of foreign policy, the 
very existence of the European Communities, with their legally binding 
8 Hence the elegant distinction suggested by René-Jean Dupuy between "droit mou" and 
"droit vert" as sub-categories of soft law. See Dupuy, "Droit déclamatoire et droit proclamatoire: 
de la coutume sauvage à la 'soft law"', in Société française de droit international, L'Elaboration 
du droit international public, Paris: Pédone, 1975, 132-148 at 140. 
9 
 It is interesting to note in this respect the wording of the decision adopted by the Foreign 
ministers to implement the basic provisions of Title Ill. The ministers inter alia "confirm that the 
customary procedures which have been set up to ensure the practical working of European 
political cooperation, in particular the Luxembourg (1970), Copenhagen (1973) and London 
(1980) reports and the Solemn Declaration on European Union (1983), and which are 
summarized in the Coutumier', remain into force." See EPC Bulletin, Doc. 86/090 (our 
underlining). 
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framework and their elaborated rules, vitiated that goal. In an interdependent 
world, the much-touted sphere of "pure" foreign policy is at best limited in 
scope, for high politics must constantly overlap with economic and trade 
issues. The pervasive Community presence in the commercial field can 
therefore not be ignored. 
Indeed, by the mid-70s, the Court of Justice had held in two landmark 
rulings that all matters of international trade had been taken away from the 
Member States and transferred to the sphere of exclusive Community 
competence10. Moreover, the ambit of the common commercial policy was 
held to be extremely wide, covering matters such as cooperation and 
development policy. 
The impact of this legal situation is immediately apparent. On the one 
hand it turned the Community into a real foreign policy player. There are few 
areas of international trade which can be regarded as devoid of political 
considerations. Whether to have a trade agreement with an Eastern Europe 
country, to take one example of great topicality, was a decision charged with 
political ramifications long before the more recent events in that part of the 
world. But more significant for our purposes was (and still is) the obverse of 
the same coin: not only are an increasing number of matters of Community 
competence to be considered by the EPC partners but, more importantly, 
some areas of Member State competence and, of course, decisions adopted 
in the EPC framework, if they are to go beyond the level of declaratory 
diplomacy, must often be implemented through Community instruments. The 
most remarkable example of this kind of political use of Commmunity 
competences were of course some of the decisions on sanctions against third 
States11 . Thus, because international reality does not bend to the division of 
10 Opinion 1/75 of 11 November 1975, (1975) ECR 1355, and Opinion 1/78 of 4 October 
1979, (1979) ECR 2871. 
11 For a full account, see P.-J. Kuyper, "Community Sanctions against Argentina: Lawfulness 
under Community and International Law", in: D. O'Keefe and H.G. Schermers (eds.), Essays in 
European Law and Integration, Deventer: Kluwer, 1982, 141-166, and Simon Nuttall, 
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competences between the Community and the Member States, EPC found 
itself not infrequently embedded in the legal matrix imposed by the Community 
regime. 
Ill. The Codification of EPC Procedures 
A mere glance at Title III of the SEA is enough to show that its principal 
aim is to codify the various procedures which have been slowly elaborated 
and refined since 197012. It is stated at the outset13  that the general objective 
assigned to European political cooperation is "to endeavour jointly to 
formulate and implement a European foreign policy". Here again words matter 
a lot: if the concept of a European foreign policy emerges for the first time in an 
EPC document, there is no mention of the necessity (or the desire) of 
establishing a common policy, as envisaged in the negotiations mandate, 
drafted in the wake of the Milan European Council. And the rest of the 
sentence makes it clear that, in EPC as in most schemes of intergovernmental 
cooperation, Member States are to remain the central - if not exclusive -
actors, both at the decision-making and at the implementation levels. 
The ensuing provisions confirm this first impression. The mechanisms 
mentioned - prior consultations, common positions, joint action - are part of the 
classical paraphernalia of political cooperation. They can at best give accrued 
efficiency to the joint foreign policy of the Twelve, provided of course that the 
latter are actually able to reach a consensus, but in theory they do not imply 
any restriction of their ultimate freedom to act unilaterally. Similarly, the 
"Interaction between European Political Cooperation and the European Community", 7 
Yearbook of European Law (1988) 211-249. 
12 Article 1 explicitly refers to the basic EPC documents (Luxembourg, Copenhagen and 
London reports and Solemn Declaration on European Union) as well as to "the practices 
gradually established among the Member States". 
13 Article 30(1). 
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various collective organs involved in the EPC process - European Council, 
Foreign Ministers, Political Committee, European Correspondants' Group -
see their role formally sanctioned, but none of them is endowed with an 
autonomous capacity to act, since all decisions have to be made by 
consensus. True, the Commission's "association" to EPC discussions is 
acknowledged14, but in a way which does not confer upon it any power of 
initiative similar to the one it holds in the Community context. The only 
innovation at this level is that the Commission, together with the Presidency, is 
given the responsibility to ensure consistency between the external policies 
pursued in EPC and within the Communìty15 — in other words between the two 
main branches, political and economic, of external relations — a point to which 
we shall return below. 
The main structural change lies in the creation of a Secretariat, placed 
under the authority of the Presidency, which it must assist in preparing and 
implementing EPC activities. Important as this step may appear, its immediate 
impact has been limited. Although the Secretariat was the first structure 
created in the EPC sphere which could be seen as going beyond a strict 
intergovernmental logiCt 6, it has not been put in a position to play a dynamic 
role of its own. The Foreign Ministers have spelled out in greater detail its size, 
status and duties in a decision adopted at the time of signing the Single Act17, 
and in which they made it clear that they did not intend to grant any substantial 
autonomy to the new body. Functionally speaking, its main tasks are of an 
organizational and administrative nature; structurally speaking, its diplomatic 
staff is limited in numbers - five officials, which cannot be seen as a real 
14 Article 30(3)(a) and (b). 
15 Article 30(5), which specifies, however, that the Presidency and the Commission each act 
"within their sphere of competence". 
16 See Jannuzzi, supra note 2, who speaks in this respect of "a-national" (as opposed to 
supranational) integration (at p. 199). 
17 Decision of 28 February 1986, EPC Bulletin, Doc. 86/090. 
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departure from the classical troika system - and all of them remain attached to 
the various Member States' diplomatic missions in Brussels18. 
Those resources appear even more meagre when confronted with the 
ambitious proposals contained in a Franco-German draft presented at the eve 
of the Milan European CounciI19. The most striking suggestion made in that 
document was the creation of a secretariat with at its head a figure - baptised 
in a somewhat pompous way as "Secretary General of the European Union" -
appointed for four years by the Heads of State and Government and with a 
staff assimilated in status to European civil servants. In other words, what was 
envisaged was a body somewhat similar in its powers and functions to the 
European Commission, and which would be called upon to play an 
autonomous political role. This highly political profile however combined two 
sorts of threats of a radically different nature: to some Member States, a 
proposal of that kind unavoidably appeared as a Fouchet-type initiative, 
capable of weakening the position of the Commission in the Community 
setting; for others, it simply went too far towards usrping the functions of 
national foreign ministries. 
The Single Act's failure to achieve a shift to a more "Community-like" form 
of cooperation is equally clear as far as EPC working methods are concerned. 
The only reference to the weight to be given to a majority opinion appears in 
Article 30(3)(c), where the Member States are invited to refrain "as far as 
possible ... from impeding the formation of a consensus and the joint actions 
this might produce". Needless to say there is no mention of the possibility of a 
vote. This, however, can hardly be seen as a surpriSe20: after all, no one really 
18 They therefore enjoy the same privileges and immunities as members of their countries' 
diplomatic missions in Brussels. See Article 30(11) of the Single Act and Decision of 28 
February 1986, Title III, Article 3. 
19 This draft is reproduced as an annex to Nuttall, supra note 2 at 220-223. 
2D It is true that the Dooge report had gone further in recommending to seek "a consensus in 
keeping with the majority opinion". But the very strategy followed in the Dooge committee — to 
seek a broad consensus, but not necessarily a unanimous agreement — made it easier to reach 
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expected that the Member States would be willing to loosen their control over 
foreign policy. What this provision actually means is that a consensus does not 
necessarily amount to a unanimous approval by all partners of the measures 
proposed: those who do not support them can, out of respect for the majority 
feeling, decide not to oppose them. This was already a standard EPC practice 
before the Single Act in fields where no vital interest was at stake. As Nuttall 
points out, the difference between EPC and Community decision-making is 
not necessarily as big as one might think2t- for, in the Community context, 
voting tends to remain the exception, rather than the rule, even after the 
extension of majority voting provided for by the Single Act. In this respect, EPC 
is probably at the same level as the Community ... before the Single Act, 
which, as is known, has rendered less threatening the ghost of the so-called 
"Luxembourg compromise". 
Generally speaking, it is therefore difficult to escape the impression that 
the system outlined in Title III is little more than a codification of the procedures 
previously agreed upon by the Twelve. Whether one must regard this result as 
disappointing actually depends on one's hopes and expectations. 
So far, we have used the term "codification" in a loose, non-legal way, as 
an indicator of the fact that if one leaves aside the few exceptions mentioned, 
Title III did little to innovate or renovate basic working practices of EPC. In a 
legal context, be it in domestic (State) law or in international law, codification 
has a slightly different, and to lawyers an obvious meaning. It assumes the 
existence of fragments of law (represented, for example, by various pieces of 
legislation or in international law by various customary norms) which through 
the codification process are put in a coherent form. Frequently, too, 
codification is "progressive": lacunae are filled in and updating takes place, so 
an agreement on a stricter wording. The price to be paid for that strategy consisted of course in 
the great number of reservations entered by representatives of one or the other governments. 
As far as EPC was concerned, both the Danish and the Greek representatives insisted on the 
necessity of sticking to the existing practices. 
21 supra note 3 at 211. 
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that the final "code" does not simply appear as an ordered mirror image of the 
fragments. 
It is clear that in Title III the process has been somewhat different. 
Whereas progressive codification has been kept to a minimum, commitments 
which at best could be described as "soft law" in the pre-Single Act era have 
been hardened into legally binding obligations. So here codification did not 
simply mean congregating a range of disparate practices, together in coherent 
form, but also elevating them to real legal status. 
IV. The Binding Character of Title III 
From a legal viewpoint, Title III contains two types of provisions. The first 
type consists of provisions defining the institutional framework in which 
cooperation is to be developed. As we have just seen, that part of the Act does 
not include radical departures from past arrangements. Nor do the provisions 
involved add to the obligations accepted by the parties in themselves: at best, 
they lay the institutional basis on which precise obligations will rest in the 
future, assuming the EPC partners agree on joint actions. 
The second type of provisions contain a series of commitments accepted 
by the Member States of the Community in their quality of EPC partners. 
Several commentators have noted the extremely vague character of most of 
these commitments. Actually, it is easy to caricature Title III. It is replete with 
conditionals and grammatical reservations: The High Contracting Parties must 
"endeavour" to coordinate their action and "to avoid any action which might 
impair their effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations"22; they 
22 Article 30, para. (1) and (2) (d). The wording of this latter provision can usefuly be compared 
with the, more stringent Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, which provides that "Member States ... shall 
abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this 
Treaty." 
-13- 
shall "as far as possible" try to coordinate their action and to refrain from 
impeding the formation of a consensus23; it is also stressed that cooperation 
on questions of security "would contribute in an essential way to the 
development of a European identity"24. Other declarations are of a clear 
programmatic nature, like the provision on security where the parties declare 
themselves "ready to coordinate their positions more closely on the political 
and economic aspects of security"25. 
More generally speaking, one cannot but be struck by the fairly loose 
commitments assumed by the parties. There is no shortage of commitments to 
consult and inform each other, to "take full account of the positions of the other 
partners"26, to "ensure that common principles and objectives are gradually 
developed and defined"27 and to regard those common positions as "a point of 
reference for the policies of the parties"28. In contrast, one finds in Title III no 
provision establishing clearly an obligation to reach a common position or to 
implement it. One is therefore tempted to conlude like Pescatore that the 
commitments contained in that part of the Single Act are not of a legal nature: 
"La consécration (of EPC) dans la forme d'un traité international n'a 
pas pour effet de créer une obligation quelconque à ceux que l'on 
appelle ici "Hautes Parties Contractantes". Le texte de l'Article 30 ne 
dépasse en aucun de ses points le niveau de déclarations  
d'intention..."29. 
Yet we do not share this view. Our divergent opinion is rooted in the 
traditional lawyer's respect for the text, coupled with a less traditional and 
23 Article 30 (2) (a) and (3) (a). 
24 Article 30 (6) (a). 
25 Article 30 (6) (a). 
26 Article 30 (2) (c). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Pescatore, supra note 1 at 52. The same doubts have been voiced by Glaesner, supra note 1 
at 309. 
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more sociological view of the interaction between law and politics. 
Weak as commitments of the kind mentioned above may appear to an 
observer familiar with Community procedures, they are not without equivalent 
on the international scene. Many international treaties, be they agreements on 
economic, military or cultural cooperation, contain clauses as general as the 
ones envisaged in Title 111. Both the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Pact 
are good examples in this respect30. One can of course discard provisions of 
that kind as too general to create legal obligations. Even if correct, this 
analysis often leads to distortions of the reality. Lawyers are naturally inclined 
to minimize the importance of international agreements deprived of binding 
force. Yet agreements of that kind can have a crucial importance. Both the 
North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Pact have shaped international relations 
in the post-World War II era, in spite of the dubious legal value of some of their 
provisions. The Helsinki Final Act, which was deliberately framed as a non-
binding document, also played a major role in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Moreover, the fact that States decide to include basic rules of behaviour in 
an international agreement, concluded and ratified with the solemnity normally 
attached to that kind of exercise, must a priori be understood as meaning that 
they intended to bind themselves in international law3t — much more so when 
this solution only prevailed after many years of hesitation. If the change was 
merely symbolic and formal, why would it have been opposed for so long? 
True, to be binding, the clauses of an agreement must create obligations, i.e. 
limit the freedom of action of the signatories. They must, in other words, be 
precise enough for an external observer to be in a position to assess whether 
-15- 
and to what extent the parties have fulfilled their obligations in a given case32; 
provisions which would leave them a complete discretion could not be 
regarded as legally binding. 
Those general remarks can be useful to understand the scope of the 
provisions contained in Title III. Thus, for instance, the various provisions 
establishing an obligation to consult or to inform the other EPC partners do 
limit, at least formally, the freedom of action of the parties. They place a 
definite burden on the Member States, even if they entail no limitation of their 
right to act unilaterally once those formal requirements have been met. True, 
commitments to "cooperate" or to "pay due attention" to the position of EPC 
partners leave an even greater margin of discretion to the parties. However, 
the latter do not enjoy an absolute freedom, and their behaviour may 
sometimes indicate whether they have had due regard to their obligations; the 
legal value of such provisions can therefore not be ruled out. Likewise, to state 
that parties "shall endeavour" to formulate a European foreign policy may 
seem an oxymoron, but in reality it creates an obligation to act in good faith, 
which is a recognized concept of international law. It thus prevents the 
Member States from protesting against the putting of an issue on the EPC 
agenda, and may be construed as creating an obligation to fund the basic 
coordination mechanisms needed for the realization of this endeavour. 
To be fair, the exact limits of such obligations are sometimes difficult to 
discern. A commitment to inform or consult each other "on matters of general 
interest" 33 
 is problematic: A state could escape its duties on the basis that the 
matter at hand was not of general interest. There is of course no "bright line" 
test to define this term, but as the EPC agenda grows, it will become 
consolidated. If a matter has been discussed in the past, it will be difficult for a 
Member State to argue that it was not of general interest. In any event, 
30 
 According to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, for instance, parties are commited to take 
,.
any action (they) deem necessary" in case of armed attack against one or more members of the 
Alliance. 
31 This reasoning is at the basis of the interpretation rule known as the 
 "effet utile" theory. See 
Virally, supra note 7 at 351. 
32 As Virally indicates, this is probably the criterion which can indicate the existence of a legal 
obligation (supra, note 7 at 325). 
33 Article 30 (2) (a). 
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uncertainties do not reduce the sharpness of the undertaking in all cases. Not 
too much should be made either from the mélange of facultative and 
imperative language in various provisions of Title III. Even the Court of Justice, 
when it approaches the loose ends of the positive law to be found in the 
Treaty, occasionally resorts to such devices34. 
Analysed in this light, many provisions of Title III can be regarded as 
legally binding. This view was shared by the Irish Supreme Court, which ruled 
that those provisions were incompatible with the neutrality provisions of the 
Irish constitution and that, accordingly, the Single Act could not be ratified 
without a constitutional amendment. A majority of the Court found irrelevant 
the argument that Title III merely firmalizes existing practices. In the words of 
Henchy, J.: 
.. there does not appear to be any constitutional bar to a non-binding 
arrangement by the State to consult with other states in the conduct of its 
foreign policy. It is quite a different matter when, as here, it is proposed 
that the State be bound by an international treaty which requires the State 
to act in the sphere of foreign relations in a manner which would be 
inconsistent with constitutional requirements35." 
What is probably troubling the critics of Title III is not so much the absence 
of legal obligations as such, but rather the absence of effective enforcement 
mechanisms. Failure to consult the European Parliament where this is 
required by the EEC Treaty will result in annulment of the measure adopted. In 
contrast, if a Member State decides to thwart, disregard or obstruct European 
political cooperation, no judicial redress will be possible, for it has deliberately 
34 See for instance the Hauer case, in which the Court consolidated its jurisprudence on human 
rights: "[I]n safeguarding those rights, the Court is bound [imperative] to draw inspiration 
[facultative] from the constitutional traditions of the Member States ... similarly, international 
treaties ... can supply guidelines [facultative] which should be followed [imperative] within the 
framework of Community law" (case 44/79, Hauer  v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, (1979) ECR 3727, at 
recital 15). 
35 Crotty  v. An Taoiseach and others, 49 CMLR (1987) 666. See the comments in J. Paul 
McCutcheon, "The Irish Supreme Court, European Political Cooperation and the Single 
European Act", LID (1988-1) 93-100, J. Temple-Lang, "The Irish Court which delayed the Single 
European Act: Crotty v. 
 An Taoiseach and others", 24 CMLRev(1987). 
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been decided not to expand the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice to 
cover provisions of Title III of the Single Act36. We do not of course deny the 
importance of this factor. Still, international legal commitments are frequently 
deprived of enforcement mechanisms other than reciprocity and counter-
measures. The interesting thing is precisely that in spite of this weakness, 
most states generally observe their international legal obligations.  
V. Legalization as a Political Exercize 
The real question to be asked in order to understand the scope of Title III 
is therefore what effect, if any, the legalization of EPC commitments is likely to 
have on the relations among the Twelve. Obviously, to such a broad question, 
answers of different types are possible. 
The first is the most simple. By inserting EPC procedures in an 
international agreement, the Member States have given legal value to 
commitments which were previously of a mere political nature. Such is, as we 
saw, the common wisdom. Even if one accepts our suggestion that before the 
Single Act, EPC rules had some international law effect, although they were 
not themselves legally binding, it is clear that their transformation into legal 
rules may imply a significant qualitative change. Legal rules assume by 
definition a greater imperative character; if a violation is established, the State 
reponsible for the violation will see its international responsibility engaged, 
and the aggrieved parties will be entitled to resort to all measures envisaged 
in international law, including of course counter-measures. 
But lawyers' traditional emphasis on possible sanctions as the criterion 
par excellence of the existence of legal obligations may be misleading, for it is 
doubtful that possible sanctions were the exclusive, or even the principal 
concern of the Member States. It is widely acknowledged that since 1970, 
European Political Cooperation has gained credibility owing essentially to its 
35 Article 31 of the Single Act. On this provision, see also below, section 6. 
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efficiency as a socialization process. Member States have got used to 
consulting each other on major international issues, to profiting from each 
other's advice and to paying due attention to each other's concerns. Such a 
collegial spirit would not have been possible had they not had reasonable 
hopes to see their partners follow the mutually agreed code of conduct. Yet it 
seems clear that the ultimate possibility of sanctions, whether legal or not, 
played at best a minimal role in this context. It is doubtful that the Single Act 
changed anything at this level. This is of course something of a paradox for 
lawyers; hence, probably, their scepticism as to the meaning of such a reform. 
What we would like to suggest in this respect is that the actual importance 
of Title III must be assessed taking as a starting point the nature of EPC as a 
socialization exercise. The legalization of EPC procedures must then be seen 
in a different, more positive light, as a means of an essentially symbolic nature 
to consolidate the "acquis" of the first years. Odd as it may seem, its most 
important effects are likely to be of a political, rather than legal, nature. 
No doubt, confidence may as a rule be increased by the existence of clear 
legal commitments. But the consolidation process did not involve facade 
changes only; its actual impact may be greater than a prima facie analysis 
would suggest. Enhanced stability, certainty and greater acceptability are 
among the side-effects which ought to be mentioned. Enhanced stability: In 
consensus-based systems, procedures are frequently the object of much 
debate; by providing both a clear set of guidelines and some hope of 
comformity to them, legal rules may render decisions easier to achieve, 
thereby increasing the overall efficiency of the system. The existence of legal 
commitments may also result in greater acceptability of the decisions achieved 
in EPC framework. This is true for each of the EPC actors, of course, but also 
for national public opinions, which such commitments might help to convince 
of the necessity to accept compromises if the Twelve are to "speak with one 
voice". A decision which would have been the object of strong criticism can be 
more easily accepted if it is somehow perceived as a result of a commitment to 
act together. Those are of course elements which do not pertain to the legal 
sphere, but which are likely to be directly affected by the legalization of EPC 
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procedures. 
The price to be paid for this greater stability may of course be a loss of 
flexibility, since legal obligations imply by definition an increased rigidity of the 
system37. Whereas a general consensus was previously sufficient to change 
the rules governing political cooperation, it will now be necessary to go 
through the cumbersome procedure of treaty provision to amend the 
provisions of Title III, and the difficulties that have surrounded the ratification of 
the Single Act have proved that this was no meager achievement. In this 
specific case, however, the risk remains fairly theoretical, for the Single Act 
contains as we saw only provisions of a general nature: questions of detail 
have been handled in the ministerial decision of 28 February 198638, which 
can be modified by consensus. Furthermore, a specific clause provides for the 
possibility of a revision of Title III "five years after the entry into force" of the 
Act39. Last but not least, EPC has always evolved in a flexible manner when 
there was a consensus to do so; it is doubtful that the Single Act will be 
construed as preventing informal changes — except of course regressive 
changes. Even if it would be consonant with the letter of the Single Act, such 
an interpretation would certainly run against the spirit of political cooperation. 
Still, these technical remarks show to what extent legalization may 
change the quality of relationships between the EPC partners. Before the 
Single Act, political cooperation was a quick, simple, informal, unbureaucratic 
exercize. Undoubtedly, the formalization of EPC procedures may alter this 
situation. So far, it has not proved detrimental to the overall efficiency of the 
system, but one should be aware in the future that a further institutionalization 
entails the risk of a loss of flexibility. 
37 As suggested by Jacqué, supra note 1, at p. 609. 
38 supra, note 16. 
39 Article 30 (12). 
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VI. A World Apart? 
European political cooperation was initially established as a world apart, 
physically and legally distinct from the Community. The overcited example of 
the Foreign ministers meeting on the same day in Copenhagen within the 
EPC framework and in Brussels qua Council of Ministers shows that in the 
early at least, some of the Member States had strong feelings in this respect. 
As observed above, this rigid dichotomy did not last for long. As time went by, 
both the Commission and the European Parliament became increasingly 
associated with EPC procedures. By the late 1970s, if not earlier, the 
mechanisms for feeding information and advice in both directions between 
the EPC and Community hierarchies had been developed to a high degree of 
speed and sophistication. Likewise, Member States- made use of the 
possibility of resorting to Community instruments to achieve EPC goals. Yet 
those contacts between the two worlds were not frequent enough to override 
the general rule of separation. In spite of their basic complementarity, EPC 
and the Community remained governed by different timetables, working 
methods and, one might add, by a different spirit and style. 
Apparently, the Single Act has not decisively altered this separation. On 
the contrary, it bases itself on the idea, advanced for the first time in the 
 
Tindemans 
 Report, that EPC and the Community are two distinct pillars on 
which European Union will one day be constructed40. Outlined in the 
Preamble of the Act, this idea is repeated and developed in the ensuing 
provisions. Thus, Article 1 makes clear that the Community and EPC each 
have their own legal basis: on the one hand, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities, and on the other, the various reports in which EPC 
aims and methods have been defined, supplemented by "the practices 
40 
 Ph.  De Schoutheete, "Le rapport Tindemans dix ans après", Politique étrangère, (1986) 527-
538.  
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gradually established among the Member States" and now codified by Title 
111 41. In each system, the powers and jurisdiction of the institutions are 
governed by different rules, as stressed in a somewhat redundant manner by 
Article 3. 
Yet institutional logic does not follow the rules of Euclidian geometry, 
where parallels never meet. If from a formal viewpoint EPC and the 
Community largely remain distinct worlds, several institutional bridges have 
been established or have seen their existence confirmed in the Single Act; the 
same rotation of Presidencies, the possibility of discussing EPC questions at 
Council meetings, confirmation of the presence of Commission 
representatives at EPC meetings, concentration of such meetings in Brussels 
instead of in the country of Presidency capital, establishment of the EPC 
secretariat in Brussels, etc.42 It has also been stressed that the policies agreed 
upon in those two fora must be consistent43. Here again, the importance of 
legalization is probably greater than one generally believes. The formal 
recognition of the Commission's participation in EPC certainly reinforces its 
legitimacy to act in a more autonomous manner than in the past. Helped by 
propitious circumstances, it may in some cases end up playing a role of policy 
initiator not totally different from the one it holds — with a much firmer legal 
basis — in the Community sphere. 
In a way, Article 31 of the Single Act well illustrates the limits inherent in 
any attempt at drawing a clear line between EPC and the Community. As 
41 'The European Communities and European Political Cooperation shall have as their 
objective to contribute together to making concrete progress towards European unity. 
The European Communities shall be founded on the Treaties establishing the European 
Coal and Steel community, the European Economic Community, the European Atomic Energy 
Community and on the subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing them. 
Political Cooperation shall be governed by Title 111. The provisions of that Title shall confirm 
and supplemnt the procedures agrees in the reports of Luxembourg (1970), Copenhagen 
(1973), London (1981), the Solemn Declaration on European Union (1983) and the practices 
gradually established among the Member States." 
42 See De Ruyt, supra note 2 at 104. 
43 Article 30(5). 
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indicated above, this provision rules out any intervention of the Court in the 
legal controversies which might arise as a result of the enshrining of EPC in a 
treaty instrument. It is possible, as some authors have suggested, that the 
active pro-integration stance adopted by the Court in many of its rulings — not 
least as regards the external relations of the Community — played an important 
role in this decision44. As Stein suggested, Article 31 offers further evidence of 
governements' aversion to "judicialization" of the diplomatic processes45. But it 
did not only result from a desire on the Member States' side to stay immune 
from any judicial interference in the sphere of foreign policy: As indicated 
above, in our view, sanctions were not their main concern. The exclusion of 
the Court can also be viewed as a means to stress that the formal legalization 
of EPC did not amount to its integration in the Community sphere. In a parallel 
way, Article 32 makes it clear that the codification of EPC procedures was not 
to be understood as a hidden attempt to instil new elements of 
intergovernmentalism into the Community46. 
Be the motivations behind this choice as they may, it is doubtful whether a 
clearcut separation between the two legal spheres is at all possible from a 
juridical point of view. To be sure, a violation of any of the legal obligations 
contained in Title III will not give rise to an action before the European Court of 
Justice on the basis, say, of Article 169 of the EEC Treaty. But there are some 
issues where the language of Article 31 cannot exclude a judicial intervention, 
whether the Member States wish it or not. An encroachment on Community 
competences decided upon within EPC could be brought before the Court of 
Justice. The matter is not entirely fanciful: one could imagine a case in which 
the Member States would agree to impose by joint State action economic 
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sanctions against a third State, thereby invading the sphere of exclusive 
Community competence in the field of common commercial policy. Even if, by 
virtue of Article 31, the Commission is precluded from requesting a review of 
the legality of such a decision on the basis of Article 173, it could sue the 
Member States jointly under Article 169, for failure to fulfil an obligation under 
the Treaty47. In other words, what we are arguing is that questions concerning 
the division of competences between EPC and the Community are of equal 
relevance to both legal orders and that, consequently, any attempt to exclude 
judicial scrutiny in toto is doomed to failure. 
This is of course a positivist lawyers' view; we would be the first ones to 
admit that similar disputes are unlikely to be resolved judicially. It would 
however be wrong to believe that merely for this reason the above legal 
analysis is of academic interest only. The very insertion in Title III of a 
provision like Article 30(5), which establishes an obligation of cohesion 
between EPC and Community action can be seen as a recognition of the need 
to provide legal signposts in a landscape of ever moving boundaries. In the 
way we view law, the tension between Article 31 and Article 30(5) is not a 
contradiction, but rather the reflection of an untenable reality, which is that total 
separation between the two systems is simply unavoidable: Because of the 
progress they have achieved in the Community, Member States have 
abdicated part of their autonomy as EPC partners. 
The more important indicator of the links which exist between these two 
worlds is probably the fact that for the first time, even if not without 
44 David Freestone and Scott Davidson, "Community Competence and Part III of the Single 
European Act", 23 CMLRev (1986) 793-801 at p. 799. 
45 Stein, supra note 2, at p. 987. 
46 "Subject to Article 3(1), to Title II and to Article 31, nothing in this Act shall affect the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities or any subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or 
supplementing them." 
47 A somewhat similar situation was at the basis of the celebrated ERTA case. The 
representatives of the Member States, meeting in the Council of Ministers, took a decision 
concerning the conclusion of an international treaty by the Member States. Officially, the 
decision was presented as a resolution, and was therefore not part of the nomenclature of 
Community acts. The Commission sued the Council, though in theory the Member States had 
not been acting qua Council. The Court held that since that act in question had legal effects on 
the Community it could review its legality. See case 22/70, Commission v. Council, (1971) ECR 
263. 
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hesitations48, provisions governing the functioning of EPC and of the 
Community have been included in one single document. The symbolic 
significance of this fact ought not to be neglected. It has confirmed in a solemn 
way the obvious: political cooperation makes sense, historically speaking, 
only if it is directly connected to the Member States' membership in the 
Community. True, the principle was an implicit part of the "acquis"; but with the 
inclusion of EPC provisions into the Single Act it has - still implicitly - acquired 
a different value. Differentiated participation in the Community and in EPC is 
now excluded: not only have all Member States accepted the principle of 
submission to EPC mechanisms, but those mechanisms cannot be opened to 
third States. The reverse is of course equally true: all new applications for 
membership in the Community must be considered not only with a view to 
maintainance of Community balance, institutionally as well as economically, 
but also in the light of the necessity for the applicant State to accept EPC 
mechanisms and the "acquis" of political cooperation. The reactions elicited by 
the Austrian application have made plain that for some States this second 
condition may present more difficulties than the first. Needless to say that this 
problem might one day stand in the way of an eventual adhesion of Eastern 
countries to the Community, even assuming that such an enlargement would 
be viable from an economic viewpoint. 
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VII. Conclusion 
The achievements of the Single Act have generally been viewed as 
extremely modest. At first sight, our analysis might appear as confirming the 
dominant scepticism. Formally speaking, the Single Act has simply raised 
political commitments to the status of legal rules. Moreover, the differences 
between the two phases should not be exaggerated: not only did the "political" 
rules of the pre-Single Act period have indirect legal effects, but the 
obligations created by Title III are so general that doubts have arisen as to 
their binding character. The change — a shift from "soft" to hard law — was 
therefore far from drastic. 
If one accepts this minimalist interpretation of the Single Act, the question 
we asked in starting can now be reformulated in a more precise way: What 
purpose did it serve to give hard law form to commitments which could already 
be regarded as having at least soft law value, without at the same time trying 
to realize some substantive step forward? Here again, several explanations 
are possible, and can to some extent complement each other. 
The first one, by far the most negative, is that the Member States, although 
wishing to express in a symbolic way their commitment to a European foreign 
policy, were not prepared to go beyond façade changes. Their reaction would 
then be somewhat reminiscent of Tancredì's remark in Tomasi di 
Lampedusa's novel ll Gattopardo: "Se vogliamo the tutto rimanga come è, 
bisogna the tutto cambi49". Not being able to agree on substantive changes, 
the Member States found in the legalization of EPC procedures an elegant 
way to get round the difficulty. One should however resist the temptation of 
excessive rationalization for, with collective actors, the outcome of a 
negotiation reflects more often a common denominator on which compromise 
48 The principle of a single treaty was agreed upon only very late in the negotiations, after 
separate treaty drafts proposed by some of the Member States had been discussed. 	 49 
 "if we want things to remain as they stand, everything must change". 
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was possible rather than a deliberate strategy. Thus, the limits of the Single 
Act must probably be seen as resulting more from the Member States' failure 
to agree on possible improvements of EPC mechanisms than from any 
machiavellìan attempt to hide their lack of political determination. 
Another explanation, more positive this time, is to be found in the nature of 
the political cooperation process. EPC history, from the Davignon Report to the 
Single Act, has been characterized by incrementalism: small steps ahead, 
bringing each time the various partners closer, and reinforcing their cohesion. 
The basic principles of such collaboration have remained extremely general; 
by their nature at least, they do not differ significantly from the cooperative 
mechanisms established at the level of the Atlantic Alliance after the Three 
Wise Men's Report in 1956, for instance. The difference rather lies in the 
density of the relationships between the partners, which is itself a product of 
an ever wider and more intricate web of contacts. It is precisely at this level 
that the codification of EPC procedures may be of some importance. Because 
of the greater stability and greater acceptability it entails, it is susceptible to 
improving the quality of cooperation among the Twelve. Seen against this 
background, Title III of the Single Act, precisely because of its limits, appears 
perfectly in line with earlier developments. 
True, this slow consolidation process is fairly a-typical at the European 
level. Students of the Community system are more familiar with a radically 
different pattern, consisting in the creation of institutions to which fairly precise 
objectives, together with some means of action of their own, are assigned. 
Law in this context is very much an agent of change, shaping the relationships 
between States and their respective societies. As we saw, the situation has 
been quite different as far as EPC is concerned. Cooperative mechanisms 
have developed on an informal basis, outside of any legal framework, and it is 
only after fifteen years that the need to acknowledge their existence formally 
has led to the adoption of an treaty. Intervening ex post facto, law has come to 
play a different role, more of consolidation than of innovation. A-typical as this 
evolution may be on the Community scene, it is far from exceptional at the 
international level, where legal rules are very often the product of evolving 
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State practice. This diachronic approach thus confirms, if necessary, that the 
spirit which runs trough the EPC provisions of the Single Act is more 
consonant to classical international law patterns than to the Community 
universe. 
One may ask however whether such a minimalist approach really does 
justice to the actual importance of the Single Act. The legalization of EPC 
procedures must mean something if it was opposed for so many years. After 
all, no matter how weak it appeared to some, the Single Act was judged 
meaningful enough for Ireland to have to modify its constitution before being 
able to ratify it, given its potential implications for Irish security. Somehow, 
there was among the Member States, in some circles at least, a diffuse feeling 
that by casting their relationships into a legal mould, they ran a risk of being 
dragged into an evolution they might not entirely be able to master5o. This 
feeling was perhaps more accurate than many thought. There is ample 
evidence in the history of European integration that the "passage to law" may 
have implications which nobody really foresaw51. We have tried to indicate a 
number of side-effects which ought not to be neglected, but the future might 
reveal. additional ones. 
w This fear was apparent throughout the Crotty case, cited above: the majority referred more to 
what Title Ill could lead to than to what it actually said. 
51 This point has been developped in Dehousse & Weiler, "The Law of Integration — An Essay 
on Legal and Institutional Patterns of Integration in Western Europe", in W. Wallace led.), The 
Dynamics of European Integration, London: Pinter, 1990 (forthcoming). 
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